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This paper develops a model to understand mechanisms behind the rise of mass 
consumption societies. The development process depicted in the model follows the 
Flying Geese pattern, in which a series of industries takes off one after another. As 
productivity improves in these industries, each consumer good becomes affordable 
to an increasingly large number of households, which constantly expand the range of 
goods they consume. This in turn generates larger markets for consumer,  goods 
which leads to further improvement in productivity. In order for such two-way 
causality to generate virtuous cycles of productivity gains and expanding markets, 
income distribution should be neither too equal nor too unequal. Some income 
inequality is needed for the economy to take off; too much equality means that the 
economy stagnates in a poverty trap. With too much inequality, the economy's 
development stops prematurely. The rise of a mass consumption society is thus an 
essential element for sustainable development. 
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 The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies
“The past few decades have seen the rise, here in America, of a new and unique
phenomenon in human history, the mass consumption society.”
George Katona, The Mass Consumption Society (1964)
1.  Introduction.
Roughly speaking, the mass consumption society can be defined as a
society, where not a few individuals, nor a thin upper class, but the
majority of families enjoys the benefits of increased productivity and
constantly expands their range of consumer goods.  Many authors have
described the mass consumption society as a relatively new phenomenon
in human history.  Katona (1964) wrote, for example,
“Throughout the course of human history, poverty has been the rule, riches
the exception. Societies in the past were called affluent when their ruling
classes lived in abundance and luxury.  Even in the rich countries of the
past, the great majority of people struggled for mere subsistence. Today in
this country minimum standards of nutrition, housing, and clothing are
assured, not for all, but for the majority.  Beyond these minimum needs,
such former luxuries as homeownership, durable goods, travel, recreation,
and entertainment are no longer restricted to a few.  The broad masses
participate in enjoying all these things and generate most of the demand for them.”
(italics added)
Although Katona stressed that this is a phenomenon unique to the
American society, virtually all the industrialized countries have gonethrough similar transformation after WWII.
2  Rostow (1960), in developing
his thesis of stages of economic growth, named the last of the five stages,
“the age of high mass consumption.”  He argued that not only the United
States, but also Canada, Australia, Western European countries, and Japan
had reached this stage.  Fourastié (1979) discussed similar development in
postwar France, from 1946 to 1975, the period that many French writers call
Les Trente Glorieuses (The Glorious Thirty Years) after the title of his book.
Many Japanese also commented on a new feature of postwar booms in the
fifties and sixties; Contrary to the prewar booms, which were mostly
driven by military demand, they were driven, or at least supported, by
consumer demands, particularly for home electronic appliances.
3
One piece of the evidence that these authors routinely present is the
penetration rates of consumer goods.  Figure 1 illustrates the typical
pattern in a stylized way.  Each curve shows the fraction of households
                                          
2Some historians argue that Katona also overstated the extent to which mass consumption is a modern phenomenon.
For example, Joel Mokyr suggested, in his personal communication to me, that “there are other societies in which
ownership and consumption of much of what society has to offer was pretty widespread,” and cited the example of
the so-called consumer revolution in the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, as described by Schama (1987).  This
raises some interesting questions.  Was mass consumption a merely consequence of the Dutch Republic’s prosperity,
or did mass consumption help the Dutch Republic to prosper?  Why did it happen in the Dutch Republic, not in the
other parts of Europe?  The model presented below should provide a useful conceptual framework for addressing
these questions.
3For the description of Japanese postwar booms and Shoh-hi-kaku-mei (The Consumption Revolution), see Kosai and
Ogino (1980) and Uchino (1978).  In the late fifties, a TV set, a washing machine, and a refrigerator were by far the
most frequently named items in consumer surveys of housewives as what they would want to purchase, to the extent
that the media called them, San-shu-no-jin-gi, after the three holy goods used when a new emperor of Japan is
crowned.  In the mid sixties, a car, an air-conditioner, and a color TV set achieved similar status of dreamed items
that they were sometimes referred as New San-shu-no-jin-gi, and sometimes as 3C (because a Japanglish word for
“air-conditioner” was “cooler.”)  It was the markets for these products that grew most rapidly during the period up
to the first oil crisis.using a particular consumer good.  For example, the use of vacuum
cleaners, washing machines, telephones, was restricted to a small section of
the population before WWII, but spread to the low-income households
during the fifties and sixties.  Many other consumer goods, such as
television sets, cars, and air-conditioners follow similar paths, with some
lags.
4  This pattern is so similar across many industrialized countries that
the penetration rates of representative goods have become the popular
yardstick for comparing the standards of living across societies.  One key
feature of this pattern is that not only the market for each consumer good
takes off, but also each takeoff is followed by one after another.  The
pattern shown in Figure 1 will be called “Flying Geese” in this paper.
5
As many countries have experienced this transformation, the very notion
of necessities and luxuries has changed.  Many consumer goods that have
penetrated into the majority of households, such as vacuum cleaners,
washing machines, telephones, televisions, refrigerators, automobiles, air-
conditioners, are now generally regarded as necessities in rich societies,
                                          
4In order for the penetration rates to be increasing, “a good” must be defined sufficiently broadly, so that a new
product is treated as the same good with old ones, if it essentially performs the same function with better quality.
This means not only that different generations of vacuum cleaners or of washing machines should be grouped
together.  It also means that black-and-white and color televisions, or record players and CD players should be
grouped together.  If the penetration rates of different vintages of such a broadly defined good were plotted, they
would exhibit hump-shaped curves, as each generation of a good replaces an old one, only to be replaced by a new
one.  This pattern of product growth and obsolescence is an interesting issue and has previously been analyzed by
Stokey (1988) and many others, but it is not the subject of this paper.
5The metaphor of flying geese was previously used by Akamatsu (1961), who referred to the inverse-V shape of the
time series for the imports, domestic production, and exports of manufacturing goods.  This pattern is now more
commonly called “Product Cycles.”and yet, they were all considered as luxuries only a half century ago.  To
quote Katona again,
 “We are rich compared with our grandparents and compared with most
other peoples of the world.  In fact, however, we are still a middle-class
society, enjoying middle-class comforts. …. The drudgery of seeking
subsistence has been supplanted for millions of people, not by abundance
and indulgence, but rather by a new concept of what are necessities and needs.”
(italics added)
The notion of necessities and luxuries not only has changed over time.   It
also varies from countries to countries.  Many goods that are taken for
granted in rich countries remain luxuries in many parts of the world.  The
question of why some countries have failed to become mass consumption
societies is at least as important as the question of why some succeeded.
This paper develops a model, which is consistent with the key features of
mass consumption societies described above, and then uses it to
understand the mechanisms behind the rise of mass consumption societies,
and to identify the conditions under which a country succeeds in making
such transformation.  What is central to the analysis is a two-way causality
between productivity improvement and the rise of a mass consumption
society.   As productivity improves, the prices of consumer goods go down,
and they become affordable to an increasingly large number of households.This in turn generates larger markets for these goods, which induce further
improvement in productivity, creating a virtuous circle of productivity
gains and expanding markets.  Or the two-way causality may mean that
the economy stagnates because the lack of productivity gains and the lack
of markets reinforce each other.
In the model developed below, the households differ only in their income.
They have the identical, nonhomothetic preferences, which have the
property that they have well-defined priority over the space of consumer
goods.  As their income levels go up, they expand the range of consumer
goods they purchase, instead of purchasing more of the same goods that
they already consume.  This has several important implications.  First, the
market size for each good depends not on the aggregate income, but on the
number of households that can afford it.  Second, when the prices of high
priority goods go down, demand for less priority goods go up.  That is to
say that there exist demand complementarities from high priority goods to
low priority goods. As the expense for essential items decline, less essential
items become affordable, which allows the households to move down
further on their shopping list.  Third, the very notion of necessities and
luxuries is a relative one.  Each consumer good is a luxury good for poor
households, but a necessity for rich households.  As a household’s income
goes up, a consumer good changes from a luxury to an amenity, and
finally, a necessity.   On the technology side, there is industry-specific
learning-by-doing, which represents dynamic increasing returns in eachconsumer goods industry.  No interindustry spillover of learning-by-doing
is assumed.
The dynamic evolution of this model economy is described by a
cooperative dynamical system, and displays the following features.  First,
the penetration rates of consumer goods show the “Flying Geese” pattern.
A series of consumer goods industries takes off one after another, even
though there is no inter-industry spillover of learning-by-doing.  The
intuition behind this pattern is easy to grasp.  The purchase of a good by
the high-income households reduces its price, which makes this good
affordable to the low-income households, which were previously unable to
purchase it.  This trickle-down process helps an industry to take off.
However, this is not the end of the story.  The purchase of a good by the
low-income households, by pushing down its price even further, helps to
reduce the expense of the high-income households.  This allows them to
purchase the next item on their shopping list.  Through this trickle-up
process, productivity gains in one industry lead to productivity gains in the
next.
Second, the set of steady states is a lattice, and the economy grows
monotonically until it converges to the least element of the lattice.  That is,
if there are multiple steady states, the economy is trapped into the lowest
steady state, where a relatively small fraction of the households consumesa relatively small set of the goods.  Thus, there is the possibility that the
trickle-down and trickle-up processes are interrupted.
Third, the dynamic evolution of the economy depends critically on income
distribution.  Some income inequality is needed for the economy to take
off; with too much equality, the economy stagnates in a poverty trap.   This
is because, in order to trigger the process, the economy needs a critical
mass of the rich households, which can afford to buy some goods, even
when they are still expensive.  With too much inequality, on the other
hand, the process stops prematurely.  This is because neither trickle-down
nor trickle-up mechanisms would work if there are too much income gaps.
To put it another way, the rise of a mass consumption society requires
income to be distributed in certain ways.  Because of this, the effects of
income transfer also turn out to be subtle.  Perhaps the analogy of the
dominos may be useful.  In order for the dominos to continue falling like a
cascade, they need to be spaced appropriately.  If they are put tightly
together, the dominos cannot fall.  If there is a big gap between dominos, a
falling domino cannot knock down the next one, hence the chain reactions
will be interrupted.
It is worth emphasizing that the model developed in this paper explains
the Flying Geese pattern based on endogenous technological changes.  One
might be tempted to argue that we observe the Flying Geese pattern simply
because different consumer goods were invented at different times.  Suchan explanation based on exogenous technological progress has a couple of
problems.  First, while the penetration rates of consumer goods display
similar patterns across many developed countries, their timings are
different across countries.  Indeed, these goods hardly have penetrated in
many underdeveloped countries.  Second, many consumer goods, such as
vacuum cleaners, washing machines, telephones, radios, televisions,
automobiles, were invented by the early twentieth century in their most
primitive forms.  Only through further improvement, these goods have
become affordable to the majority of the households in developed
countries.   And the market size is one of the critical factors determining
the speed  of such improvement.  This is not to deny the possibility that
some major technological advances that were applicable to many
industries, such as electric motors or Taylorism, were responsible for
making the rise of mass consumption societies possible for the first time in
human history.  Any theory based on exogenous technological events,
however, cannot explain why the United States led the way in becoming
the mass consumption society nor why certain goods spread faster than
others.
There are some closely related studies in the literature.  Baland and Ray
(1991) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) both studied models of
increasing returns and nonhomothetic preferences and explored how
income distribution affects development through demand composition
effects.  In Baland and Ray, the notion of a necessity and a luxury is anabsolute one, and they demonstrated that redistributing from the rich who
consumes a luxury, to the poor who cannot consume enough necessities,
may reduce unemployment.   Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny used
preferences similar to this paper, and showed how income distribution
affects the two-way causality between productivity gains and expanding
markets through the profit multiplier in a monopolistic competition model
of technology adoption.  Both models are static, and hence do not generate
the Flying Geese pattern.   Matsuyama (1991a) showed how a productivity
improvement in agriculture spills over to manufacturing through demand
complementarity.  With a lower price of food, the households can afford to
buy the manufacturing good, which stimulates learning-by-doing in
manufacturing.  There is only one manufacturing good, so that the model
does not generate the Flying Geese pattern.  Furthermore, income
distribution plays no role in that model.
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out what this paper is not about.
Most work that followed Katona’s contribution came from the behavioral
science literature, which put emphasis on sociological and psychological
aspects of mass consumption societies.  They discuss the importance of
mass-psychology, “conspicuous consumption,” the desire of consumers to
“keep up with Joneses,” their inability to “make ends meet,” and the
attempts by big businesses to manipulate the formation of the mass
consumer culture, etc.  In the model presented below, all the households
have the identical, non-interdependent preferences, are perfectly informedof all the goods available, and faced with well-defined budget constraints.
Therefore, the present paper has nothing to say about these aspects of mass
consumption societies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the model,
and derives the dynamical system governing the evolution of the economy.
Section 3 discusses some general properties of the system.  Sections 4 and 5
look at special cases to examine in detail the roles of income distribution.
Section 6 discusses alternative specifications of the model.  Possible
extensions are discussed in the concluding section.
2  The Model.
This section describes the structure of the economy and derives the system
that governs the dynamic trajectory of the economy.  Many assumptions
discussed below are adopted to simplify the exposition, and can be relaxed
or replaced by alternative assumptions, as will be explained in Section 6.
The economy is populated by a continuum of households with the unit
measure.  They supply labor, and consume some goods and leisure.  Goods
are produced by labor only.  The detailed descriptions of the model are
now given, first the preferences, then income distribution, and finally
technologies.2.1. Goods and Preferences:
There are J+1 goods, labeled j = 0,1,...,J.  Good zero is food; it is a
homogenous, divisible good.  In addition, there are J manufacturing goods,
indexed as j = 1,...,J.  They are indivisible and come in discrete units.  All
the households have the same preferences, given by the following utility
function:
















η if c > 1
where c is food consumption, l is the leisure, and xj  is an indicator function,
with xj  = 1 if manufacturing good j is consumed and x j  = 0 if it is not.
Food is a necessity, and the household needs to consume a minimum
amount of food, the subsistence level, before consuming any
manufacturing good.  The subsistence level is normalized to be one to ease
the notational burden.   It is also assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that
the propensity to spend on food is equal to zero above the subsistence
level.  The preferences over manufacturing goods have the property that
the households benefit nothing from consuming good k, if xj  = 0 for some j
< k.  This implies that the households consume good k, only if they alsoconsume all the manufacturing goods, whose indices are less than k.  In
other words, the households have a well-defined priority over the set of
manufacturing goods, with a lower indexed good is higher on their
shopping list. What is also implicit in the preferences is that the
household’s demand for each manufacturing good satiates after one unit.
It is worth emphasizing that neither the strong form of Pareto-Edgeworth
complementarities nor the assumption that all the households have the
same ordering are essential in the following analysis: see sections 6B and
6C for more detailed discussion.  What is essential is that the households
do not change their orderings, when the relative prices change.   As long as
the range of relative price movements is appropriately restricted, much of
the results would carry over for a broad class of preferences.  The above
specification is convenient only because it eliminates the need for
restricting the range of relative price movements.
6
                                          
6Note that lexicographic preferences would not work for this purpose.  The households have lexicographic
preferences over the manufacturing goods, if they always prefer having good j than not having good j, independent
of their consumption of higher indexed goods.  This does not mean, however, that they always buy good j before
good k > j.  This is because they prefer having good k than not having good k, given that they don’t have good j.
Therefore, the households may end up consuming good k > j without consuming good j.  This happens when the
households cannot afford good j, but can afford good k > j.  In the specification adopted here, they buy leisure instead
of good k > j if they cannot afford good j.2.2 The Budget Constraint and Individual Demand:
The budget constraint for the household with income I  is
pc px l I jj j
J
0 1 ++ ≤
= ∑ , where p0 is the price of food, pj  is the price of
manufacturing good j, with leisure being taken as the numeraire.
7   Because
of the well-defined priority over the manufacturing goods, the household’s
consumption problem can thus be simplified as: to choose c, k, and l to
maximize:
c  if c ≤  1,
 U  =
1 + k +η l if c > 1
subject to the budget constraint,  pc p l I j j
k
0 1 ++ ≤
= ∑ .
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the marginal utility of leisure is
sufficiently small that η pj < 1for all j = 1, 2,...,J.  This means that the
households purchase as many goods as possible from the top of their
shopping list.  Thus, the consumption demand of each household takes the
following form:
                                          
7As seen later, the prices do depend on time, as productivity changes over time.  Time is suppressed, however, to
minimize the notation, until needed.   Three additional assumptions are also implicit in this formulation of the
household’s problem.  First, there is no saving and borrowing.  Second, there is no intertemporal substitution of
consumption.  Third, households cannot set up lotteries.  Introducing these factors would only obscure the basicI < P0  ⇒  c = I/P0 , l = 0, xj = 0  ( j = 1,...,J),
Pk ≤  I < Pk+1  (k = 0, ..., J− 1)  ⇒  c = 1, l = I −  Pk , xj = 1 ( j = 1,...,k), xj = 0  ( j =
k + 1,...,J),
I ≥  PJ  ⇒  c = 1, l = I −  PJ , xj = 1 ( j = 1,...,J),
where Pk =∑ =
k
j j p
0  can be interpreted as the minimum level of income that
induces the household to consume manufacturing good k.
The most important feature of the individual demand curve derived above
is that an additional income translates into an additional demand for a
manufacturing good, only when it pushes the household’s income above
the critical level of income.  If the household’s income level is well below Pj
, an additional income would be spent on food, leisure, or manufacturing
goods with lower indices.  For the poor, good j remains a luxury, which is
beyond their means.  If the household’s income level exceeds Pj, on the
other hand, an additional income would be spent on leisure, or
manufacturing goods with higher indices.  For the rich, good j is a
necessity, with which they are already satiated.  What is essential for the
following analysis is that the marginal propensity to spend on a
manufacturing good is small when income is either very low or very high.
                                                                                                                                       
mechanisms of the model, without offering much additional sight that is worthy of complications that they generate.
See section 7 for more discussion.This property of demand captures the following idea.  A manufacturing
good is a luxury for many at a lower level of economic development.  As
the economy develops and an overall level of income grows, it changes
from a luxury to an amenity, and then to a necessity.  In other words, the
very notion of what is a luxury and what is a necessity changes with
income.
8
2.3  Income Distribution and Aggregate Demand
Having derived individual demand curves, the next step is an aggregation.
Let  F be the distribution of income across households, i.e., F(I) is the
fraction of the households, whose income is less than or equal to I.  Income
differs across the households due to skill differences, reflected in
differences in the effective labor supply.  The total labor supply is thus
equal to L = ∫
∞
0 ) (I IdF .
9
                                          
8Here, “a necessity” is defined as a good, whose share in the household expenditure goes up when the household
income declines. “A luxury” is defined a good whose share in the household expenditure goes up when the
household income increases sufficiently.  The qualifier “sufficiently” is needed because of the discreteness of a good.
If a household cannot afford to buy an air-conditioner, it cannot afford to buy it even when its income goes up
infinitesimally.  The definition of a necessity (luxury) commonly found in textbooks, i.e., a good, whose income
elasticity of demand is less (greater) than one, is not appropriate in the present model, because this definition
assumes the divisibility of goods and deals only with an infinitesimal change in income.
9 Since the households generally consume leisure, one may want to call I −  l  “(labor) income” instead, in which case I
may be called “the purchasing power” of the household.  Needless to say, this is purely a matter of semantics, and
none of the analysis would be affected.The income is the only source of heterogeneity across the households.




a manufacturing good j, and no household purchases more than one unit of
any manufacturing good, the aggregate demand for good j is equal to the
mass of the households, whose income is higher than Pj :











. (  j = 1,...,J)
Many features of the aggregate demand functions, eq. (1), deserve
emphasis.  First, it depends on income distribution, because the marginal
propensity to spend on a manufacturing good varies with the household
income.  Second, it is bounded from above by one.  This is because the size
of the market for a manufacturing good is limited by the number of
households that can afford to consume it, not by the aggregate income of
the economy. Third, a decline in the price of good i does not affect the
demand for good j < i  (Cji = ∂ Cj/∂ pi = 0), while it generally increases the
demand for good  j ≥  i  (Cji ≥  0).  In other words, demand complementarity
(in the sense of Hicks-Allen) exist from a lower indexed good to a higher
indexed good, but not the other way around.  This is because of the
asymmetric way in which the income effect of price changes operates.  A
decline in the price of good i only affects the households, whose income is
higher than Pi  , and these households may respond by spending theincreased real income on higher indexed goods, but never on lower
indexed ones.  Fourth, the aggregate demand for manufacturing goods is
decreasing in indices, C1 ≥  C2 ≥  …≥  CJ, because all the households have the
same priority across these goods.
2.4  Technologies.
All the goods are produced in competitive industries with constant returns
to scale technologies. Producing one unit of food requires a0 units of labor,
which is constant over time.  Labor productivity in manufacturing
industries can improve, because of an industry-specific  learning-by-doing.
More specifically, producing one unit of manufacturing good j as of time t
requires aj(t) = Aj(Qj(t)), where Aj(• ) is a decreasing function, and Qj(t) is the
discounted cumulative output of industry j, given by




j j j ds t s s C ) ( exp ) ( δ δ  ≤  1, ( j = 1,...,J)
where  δ j  > 0.  The idea is that each industry learns to produce more
efficiently, as it accumulates more manufacturing experiences.
Furthermore, producers do not take into account these learning effects
when choosing their output, as they are external to them.  The parameter δ j
may be interpreted both as the speed of learning in industry j and as thedepreciation rate of learning experiences.  To see this, differentiating the
above expression with respect to t yields
(3) Qt j
•
() = δ j {Cj (t) −  Qj (t)}. ( j = 1,...,J)
where the dot indicates the time derivative.  Note also that the depreciation
keeps Qj(t) from growing unbounded.   Indeed, as seen in (2), it is bounded
from above by one, because Cj(t) is bounded from above by one.
What is important here is the assumption that there exist some forms of
dynamic increasing returns in each consumer goods industry.  Learning-
by-doing in production is adopted here because it is the simplest (and
perhaps most standard) way of modeling dynamic increasing returns.  It is
also worth pointing out that there is an alternative interpretation of eqs. (2)
and (3): learning-by-doing in consumption.  The “price” of a consumer
good that the household must pay includes not only the price charged by
the producers, but also the effort required by the household to use the
good.  As more households accumulate experiences, the required amount
of effort will decline, thereby reducing the effective price of the good,
measured in leisure.  Such dynamic consumption externalities would be
isomorphic to learning-by-doing in production in the present model. The
distinction between these two forms would be critical in an open economy
(see Section 7).2.5  The Dynamical System.
We are now ready to derive the dynamical system that describes the law of
motion governing the trajectory of the economy.  First, note that perfect
competition in each industry ensures that the price of each good is equal to
the marginal (and average) cost, which is nothing but the unit labor
requirement.  (Recall that labor is the numeraire).   Therefore, we have
(4) p0 = a0 and pj (t)= Aj (Qj (t)) ( j = 1,...,J).
Inserting (4) into (1) yields










i i t Q A a F
1
0 )) ( ( 1  ≡  Dj(Q(t)) , ( j = 1,...,J)
where Q = (Q1,Q2 ,…, QJ) ∈ [0,1]
J.  Let D(Q) ≡  (D1(Q), D2(Q), …, DJ(Q)).  Note
that Dij = ∂ Di/∂ Qj = 0 for all  i < j and Dij ≥   0  for all  i ≥   j  due to the
(asymmetric) demand complementarity.  Therefore, the mapping, D:
[0,1]
J→ [0,1]
J, is increasing in that Q’–Q 
J
+ ℜ ∈  implies D(Q’)–D(Q) 
J
+ ℜ ∈ , where
J
+ ℜ  is the set of J-dimensional nonnegative vectors.Inserting (5) into (3) yields
(6) Qt j
•
()  = δ j {Dj (Q(t)) −  Qj (t)} ≡  Ψ j(Q(t)) , ( j = 1,...,J)




where Ψ  = (Ψ 1, Ψ 2, …, Ψ J): [0,1]
J→
J ℜ  is a vector field on [0,1]
J.
One feature of this dynamical system is worth emphasizing.  In a steady
state, the value of Qj is equal to the fraction of the households that consume
good  j.  This feature of the system makes the following results easy to
interpret.
3.   Some General Properties.
One major advantage of the present model is that it has many general
properties that hold true for an arbitrary number of industries, which are
discussed in this section.  A few words of caution should be made here.
First, different properties discussed below require different degrees of
regularity conditions, which will not be stated for the sake of the simplicity
and clarity of presentation.  Second, some basic terminologies of thedynamical system theory will not be formally defined.  Only the intuitive
meanings are stated.  The reader interested in formality should consult a
standard textbook of the dynamical system theory.  Third, the reader not
interested in generality may want, at least at first reading, to skim through
the rest of this section and to move onto the subsequent sections, where the
low dimensional cases, J ≤  2, are discussed in detail.
(P1): [0,1]
J is positively invariant.
This property merely states that, if the economy starts in [0,1]
J, the economy
remains in [0,1]
J forever, and hence the system can describe the trajectory
for the entire future.  To see why (P1) is true, note from eq. (6) that Qj = 0
implies Ψ j(Q) ≥  0, and that Qj  = 1  implies Ψ j(Q) ≤  0.  In other words, the
vector field always points inward at the boundary of [0,1]
J, so that the
trajectory cannot escape [0,1]
J.
(P2): Ψ ij ≡  ∂Ψ i /∂ Qj = 0 if i < j; Ψ ii = δ i(Dii −  1); Ψ ij = δ iDij ≥  0 if i > j.
The dynamical system is thus recursive and cooperative.  It is recursive in
that the dynamics of  (Q1, … , Qj) is independent of that of  (Qj+1, … , QJ) for
all j.  The reason for this is asymmetry in which demand complementarity
operates in this economy.   As one industry improves its productivity and
its cost and output price declines, only the industries with higher indicessee demand for their goods increase.  The resulting increase in output leads
to a faster learning only in these industries. The system is also cooperative in
the sense of Hirsch (1982), that is Ψ ij  ≥  0 for all i  ≠   j. The system is
cooperative because productivity improvement and the resulting price
reduction in one industry may increase but never reduces demand in other
industries.
It should be noted that the mechanism through which productivity
improvement spillovers from an industry with a lower index to an industry
with a high index is demand complementarity.  In the present model, all
the learning-by-doing effects are industry-specific.  An industry learns
nothing from manufacturing experiences of other industries.
Let 
J
+ + ℜ  denote the set of J-dimensional vectors with positive
components.
(P3):  M+  ≡ [] { }
J J Q Q + ℜ ∈ Ψ ∈ ) ( 1 , 0  = [] { }
J J Q Q D Q + ℜ ∈ − ∈ ) ( 1 , 0 ,  M++  ≡
[] { }
J J Q Q + + ℜ ∈ Ψ ∈ ) ( 1 , 0  = [] { }
J J Q Q D Q + + ℜ ∈ − ∈ ) ( 1 , 0 ,  M–  ≡   [] { }
J J Q Q + ℜ ∈ Ψ − ∈ ) ( 1 , 0
= [] { }
J J Q D Q Q + ℜ ∈ − ∈ ) ( 1 , 0 , and
M–– ≡   [] { }
J J Q Q + + ℜ ∈ Ψ − ∈ ) ( 1 , 0  = [] { }




+ ∈ℜ ()   () ℜ ++
J  implies Qt
J
•
+ ∈ℜ ()   () ℜ ++




J ()   () ℜ ++
J  implies −∈ ℜ
•
+ Qt
J ()   () ℜ ++
J for all t  ≥  s .  This is anotherproperty of a cooperative system, which maintains the monotonicity of
trajectories. See Smith (1995, Proposition 3.2.1).  Roughly speaking, it
means that all the industries move together.
(P4): The set of steady states, S ≡ [] { } 0 ) ( 1 , 0 = Ψ ∈ Q Q
J  = [] { } ) ( 1 , 0 Q D Q Q
J = ∈ , is a
nonempty, compact lattice, where the ordering is induced by
J
+ ℜ .  The
greatest element of S is sup M+ and its least element is inf M–.
This follows from applying Tarski’s (1955) fixed-point theorem to D:
[0,1]
J→ [0,1]
J.  A lattice is a partially ordered set, which contains both the
least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of any pair of its elements.
One important feature of a lattice is that, if it is compact, it contains both its
greatest and least elements.
(P5): For any initial condition, Q(0) ∈ [0,1]
J , lim t→∞  Q(t) ∈  S.
Thus, the system is globally convergent; the economy converges to a steady
state without any exception.  To understand this, note first that any one-
dimensional dynamical system is globally convergent. Since the dynamics
of Q1  is independent of the rest of the system (the recursiveness), it can be
viewed as a one-dimensional system, hence it converges globally.  This
effectively reduces the dimensionality of the system by one.  Repeating this
process shows that the global convergence of the entire dynamics. It is also
worth pointing out that, even without recursiveness, a cooperative systemis globally convergent if J  ≤  2 (Smith 1995, Theorem 3.2.2).  If J  ≥  3,
cooperativeness implies that the trajectory converges to a steady state, for
almost  all the initial conditions under the regularity condition called
irreducibility (Smith 1995, Theorem 4.1.2).
(P6): If Q(0) =(0,0,…,0), Q(t) ∈  M+ for all t > 0, and lim t→∞  Q(t) = inf M–, the
least element of S.
The first part follows from Q(0) =(0,0,…,0) ∈  M+ and the positive invariance
of M+ .  The second part then follows from (P4).  Note that (P6) does not
require recursiveness.
The first part of (P6) states that, if the economy starts with very little
manufacturing experiences, all the industries grow monotonically in
productivity.  Since Cj = Dj(Q) is increasing in Q for all j and C1 ≥  C2 ≥  …≥  CJ,
the dynamics, if it starts sufficiently close to (0,0,…,0), show the Flying
Geese pattern.
The second part of (P6) implies that the monotone growth of industries
may stop prematurely and the economy may fail to develop to reach its full
potential.  If S contains more than one element, the economy will be
trapped into the lowest of them.  In this case, a relatively small fraction of
households is able to enjoy a relatively small number of consumer goods.In other words, a larger fraction of households would enjoy a larger
number of consumer goods in every other steady state.
(P7): If Q* ∈  S is an isolated, unstable steady state, there exists a monotone
increasing heteroclinic orbit from Q*, which converges to the least element
of {} QS QQ
J ∈−∈ ℜ + *  and a monotone decreasing heteroclinic orbit from Q*,
which converges to the greatest element of {} QS Q Q
J ∈− ∈ ℜ + * .  These orbits
are tangent at Q* to the eigenvector associated with the stability modulus
of Q*.
Figure 2 illustrates (P7), which can be proved under the irreducibility
condition (Smith 1995, Theorem 4.3.3). A unstable steady state is
sandwiched by two stable steady states, one from “above” and one from
“below,” and the flow of this J-dimensional dynamics around unstable
steady states behaves as in a one-dimensional system.  In other words,
there is a sense in which stable and unstable steady states exist alternately.
In summary, the dynamics of this economy show the Flying Geese pattern,
in which a series of industries take off one after another.  How high they
can fly, however, depends critically on the structure of the economy.  There
may be multiple steady states, and, in that case, the economy will converge
to the lowest of them.   Even if the steady state is unique, its level may be
low, leaving most consumer goods unaffordable to the majority ofhouseholds.  In other words, the economy may fail to transform itself to a
mass consumption society.  Some important questions need to be
addressed.  What determines the structure of S?  How does it depend on
income distribution?  What kind of redistributive policies, if any, could
eliminate low-level steady states? To answer these questions, the following
sections turn to the case, where a number of industries is small.
4.  The Case of J = 1.
Consider the case, where J = 1.  By dropping the subscript and suppressing
the time, eq. (5) is simplified to
Q
•
= δ  {D(Q) −  Q} ,
where D (Q)  ≡  1 –F(a0  + A (Q)) is the aggregate demand for the (only)
manufacturing good, which increases with Q, whose exact shape depends
on, among other things, income distribution, F.    I n  a  s t e a d y  s t a t e ,  t h e
fraction of the household, which consumes the manufacturing good is
given by Q* = 1–F(a0 + A(Q*)). When the economy starts at Q(0) = 0, it
converges to the lowest of the steady states.  The economy that sees the rise
of a mass consumption society is the economy whose (lowest) steady state
level is high.Generically, there is an odd number of steady states, alternating between
stable and unstable ones. In Figure 3, there are three.  The economy
converges to the lowest and cannot develop further.  In this case, a slight
upward shift of the D curve makes a big difference, if it eliminates the
lowest of the steady states.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that
the economy would perform well if the steady state is unique.  See Figure
4, where the two graphs, each representing the aggregate demand as a
function of Q, are, in a way, very similar.  Yet, the economy develops very
differently.  The basic message of Figures 3 and 4 is that even a slight
exogenous change can lead to the rise of a mass consumption society in an
economy, which would otherwise stagnate.
4.1 Shifts in the D curve
One possible way in which the D  curve can be shifted is a change in
agricultural productivity.  An decline in a0 shifts the D curve upward,
because the lower price of food makes it possible for a larger fraction of the
households to buy the manufacturing good.  If the change is small, only a
small number of households is induced to buy the good initially.
However, their purchase reduces its price, which makes the next group of
households buys the good, which further reduces the price, so that the next
group can buy it as well.  This process of a trickle-down from the higher-
income households to the lower-income households can go a long way,even if the initial change is small.  Note also that, in the case of Figure 3,
even a small, temporary, agricultural boom can make a big, long-run
impact.  Once the economy started moving sufficiently close to the higher
steady state, the reverse change would not stop the rise of a mass
consumption society.
A food aid has the same effect with a decline in a0.  The above exercise thus
can be viewed as an illustration for, among others, how the Marshall plan
helped Western Europe to become a mass consumption society so quickly
after WWII.
10
The above exercise can also be used to see the effect of one type of changes
in income distribution, F.  Note that a change in F  shifts the D curve
upward, if and only if F after the change first-order-stochastically
dominates F before the change.
4.2  The Effects of Income Inequality
The effects of income inequality are much harder to analyze, because any
standard measure of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, is of no use.
                                          
10Our discussion focuses on the effect of a decline in the food price under the assumption that the
economy in the lowest steady state.  However, the analysis itself is entirely symmetric.  Figures 3 and 4Neither is the second-order stochastic dominance.  It is easy to see that
mean-preserving spreads may increase or decrease the level of the lowest
steady state.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which one could say that income
distribution can be neither too equal nor too unequal for virtuous circles of
productivity gains and expanding markets to operate smoothly.  Suppose
that, under some income distribution F, the economy satisfies the
condition, which enables it to transform to a mass consumption society to
its fullest extent.  That is, the lowest (and unique) steady state is Q* = 1, as
shown in Figure 5a.  Starting from this situation, redistribute income to
equalize it completely.  Then, the situation becomes Figure 5b, in which
case the economy stagnates Q* = 0.  With perfect equality, the process does
not even begin, and the economy stagnates in a poverty trap.  Some
inequality is needed for the economy to take off.  This is because, to trigger
the process, some households have to be rich enough to be able to buy the
good.  Now, consider the other extreme: redistribute everything to a
fraction of the households, and leave nothing to the rest.  Then, the
situation becomes Figure 5c.  In this case, the economy develops initially,
but the development stops prematurely.   This is because the trickle-down
                                                                                                                                       
can also be used to illustrate how an increase in the prices of food and other essential items might trigger
economic crises and could lead to “the fall of the mass consumption society.”mechanism is interrupted, if there is too much income gap.  Dominos
cannot continue falling, if they are spaced too apart.
4.3  The Case of Four Classes
To explore the effects of redistribution further, let us consider the following
special case.  The population is divided into four classes of households: the
Rich (R), the Upper-middle class (U), the Lower-middle-class (L), and the
Poor (P).  The households within each class have the same level of income,




P, respectively.  The sizes of these classes




P, respectively, which add up to one.  It is
also notationally convenient to define 0 < N
R < N
U < N
L < 1 by N






L ≡  n
R + n
U + n
L = 1 −  n
P.
Furthermore, to limit the number of possibilities, it is assumed that I
R > a0 +
A(0) and I
P < a0 + A(1).   That is, the Rich are so rich that they can afford to
buy the good, regardless of the level of economic development, and the
Poor are so poor that they cannot afford to buy the good, even if the
economy develops fully.  Figure 6 shows the shape of the D curve in this
four-class economy, which is actually a step function.  The dynamics can
thus be analyzed by superimposing the 45° line on this step function.  It is
easy to see that;If I
U < a0 + A(N
R), then lim t→∞  Q(t) = N
R,
If I
U ≥  a0 + A(N
R) and I
L < a0 + A(N
U), then limt→∞  Q(t) = N
U;
If I
U ≥  a0 + A(N
R) and I
L ≥  a0 + A(N
U), then limt→∞  Q(t) = N
L.
These results are summarized in Figure 7.
The effects of some exogenous income redistribution can ready be seen
from Figure 7.  For example, suppose that, initially, the parameters are such
that the economy is in Region I, given by Point X or by Point Y.   Then,
imagine that some members of the Upper-middle class become Rich at the
expense of the Poor.  In Figure 7, the effect of this change is captured by an
increase in N
R and by a decline in A(N
R), while neither N
U  n o r  A(N
U)
change. If the change is sufficiently small, it just means that a larger
fraction of the households buy the good, simply because there are more
Rich households in this economy.  If the change is sufficiently large--how
large depends on how close X or Y originally is to the line, I
U  = a0 + A(N
R)--,
it puts the economy into Region II (in the case of X) or into Region III (in
the case of Y).  Thus, every Upper-middle class family (in the case of X), or
even every Lower-middle class family (in the case of Y), will eventually be
able to enjoy the good.  Figure 8 illustrates this possibility.  This thought
experiment thus suggests that the presence of a relatively large number of
wealthy households helps the economy to develop, with the benefits of
increased productivity trickling down from the Rich to the Upper-middleto the Lower-middle classes, while leaving the Poor behind.  This arguably
suggests one reason why the United States led the way in becoming a mass
consumption society.
As a second thought experiment, consider redistributing income from the
Upper-middle class to the Lower-middle class.  Possible effects are
illustrated by the arrows in Figure 7.  The slopes of these arrows are equal
to n
L/n
U.  For the case indicated by the shorter arrow, the economy moves
from II to III.  This suggests the possibility that a larger fraction of the
families will be able to enjoy the good as a consequence.  Narrowing the
income gap between the Upper and Lower middle classes helps the
benefits of productivity gains trickle down all the way to the Lower-middle
class.  The longer arrow, however, suggests another possibility.  In this
case, the economy moves from II to I.  The trickle-down process is cut
short, because of wider income gaps between the Rich and the Upper-
middle class.  Figure 9 illustrates the dynamics of the thought experience.
5  The Case of J = 2.
Let us now consider the case, where J = 2.  Eq. (5) is now given by
Q1
•
= δ  1 {D1(Q1) −  Q1}
(9)Q2
•
= δ  2 {D2(Q1, Q2) −  Q2}
where D1(Q1) ≡  1–F(a0 + A1(Q1)) ≥  D2(Q1, Q2) ≡  1–F(a0 + A1(Q1)+ A2(Q2)).  Figure
10 illustrates (9).  The dynamics of Q1 can be analyzed as a one-dimensional
system, which has been discussed in the previous section.  The dynamics of
Q2, on the other hand, depends on Q1.  As Q1 increases monotonically from
0 to its (lowest) steady state level, Q1*, the curve D2(Q1, Q2) shifts up from
D2(0, Q2) to D2(Q1*, Q2).   Thus, not only the purchases of good 1 by the
high-income households make it possible for the low-income households to
buy good 1 through the trickle-down process.  The purchase of good 1 by
the low-income households, by reducing the price of good 1 further, allows
the high-income households to buy good 2.  It is this trickle-up process that
transmits the productivity gains from one industry to another, generating
the Flying Geese pattern.
One possible configuration of the phase diagram for the dynamical system
(9) is illustrated in Figure 11a, which assumes that the D1 curve intersects
with the 45° line three times, so that there are three steady state levels of Q1.
They are depicted by the three vertical lines in the phase diagram.  It is also
assumed that the D2 curve does not intersect with the 45° line, if Q1 is equalto its value at the highest intersection of the D1 curve with the 45° line.
11  As
shown, there are multiple steady states, which form a lattice, as (P4) states.
As (P7) states, for each unstable steady state, there are a pair of stable
steady states that are connected with trajectories, one from above and one
from below.   The least element and the greatest element of the lattice are
both stable steady states.  Starting from (Q1,  Q2) = (0,0), the economy
converges to the least element, as (P6) states.  (The heavily barbed
trajectory illustrates the convergence.)  Because of the presence of this
steady state, the economy cannot develop any further.  In particular, it
cannot reach the greatest element of the lattice.
Now, suppose that agricultural productivity improves, a decline in a0,
which shifts the D1 curve up sufficiently that it now intersects only once
with the 45° line.  After this change, the phase diagram looks as in Figure
11b.  There is now a unique steady state, to which the economy
monotonically converges.  (Again, the heavily barbed trajectory illustrates
the convergence.)   The intuition should be easy to grasp.  A high
agricultural productivity, or a low food price, now enables more
households to buy good 1, which helps to keep the trickle down process
going further down to the lower income households.  This change initially
may have little impact on good 2.  As the trickle-down process in good 1
                                          
11Figure 11a also assumes that the D2 curve intersects with the 45° line three times for an intermediate range of Q1,
which includes the low and middle steady state values of Q1, but these are not crucial for the following discussion.   It
should also be noted that neither Figure 11a nor Figure 11b are not drawn “up to scale.”continues and the price of good 1 keeps falling, however, the trickle-up
process starts working.  Thanks to the low price of good 1, the high-income
households now start buying good 2, which triggers the trickle-down
process in good 2.
Let us consider the case of four classes, as in the previous section, except
that it is now assumed that I
R > a0 + A1(0) + A2(0) and I
P < a0 + A1(1).  That is,
the Rich is so rich that they can afford to buy both goods, regardless of the
level of economic development, and the Poor is so poor that they cannot
afford to buy even good 1, even if the economy develops fully.
Furthermore, let us assume that A1(N
R) < A1(N
L )+A2(N




U).   Then, there are six regions to distinguish, which are given
by
If I
U −  a0 < A1(N




R) ≤  I
U −  a0 < A1(N
U)+A2(N
R); I
L −  a0 < A(N




R) ≤  I
U −  a0 < A1(N
L )+A2(N
R); I
L −  a0 ≥  A1(N




U −  a0 ≥  A1(N
U)+A2(N
R); I
L −  a0 < A(N




U −  a0 ≥  A1(N
L )+A2(N
R); A1(N
U) ≤  I
L −  a0 < A1(N
L)+A2(N





U −  a0 ≥  A1(N
L )+A2(N
R); I
L −  a0 ≥  A1(N
L)+A2(N
U), then limt→∞  Q(t) = (N
L, N
L),
which is summarized in Figure 12.Not surprisingly, the effects of some forms of income redistribution in this
case is similar in many ways to the case of J = 1, discussed in the previous
section.  For example, if some members of the Upper-middle class become
Rich at the expense of the Poor, the economy could move from Region I to
II, from II to IV, from I to III, from III to V or from III to IV.  All these
possibilities suggest that the presence of a relatively large number of
wealthy households could help the economy to develop, with the benefits
of increased productivity trickling down from the Rich to the Upper-
middle to the Lower-middle classes, while leaving the Poor behind.
As in the case of J = 1, redistributing income from the Upper-middle class
to the Lower-middle class, by narrowing the gap between the two middle
classes, could help the trickle-down process to reach the Lower-middle
class.  This occurs if the transfer of income moves the economy from II to
III (or from V to VI).  Or, by widening the gap between the Rich and the
Upper-middle class, the transfer could block the trickle-down process from
reaching the Upper-middle class.  This occurs if the change moves the
economy from II to I (or from V to III).
With J = 2, however, there is a new possibility, which is not present in the
case of one industry.  The Upper-middle class could gain from
redistributing its income to the Lower-middle class.  This somewhat
paradoxical effect occurs if the redistribution moves the economy from II to
V or to VI.  By narrowing the gap between the two middle classes, thistransfer of income helps the trickle-down process in good 1 to reach the
Lower-middle class.  The purchase of good 1 by the Lower-middle class
helps to reduce the price of good 1, which now allows the Upper-middle
class to buy good 2, which would not be affordable to them without the
transfer being made.  Due to this trickle-up mechanism, the Upper-middle
class ends up gaining from giving some of their income away to the Lower-
middle class.
 6.  Robustness
In the model presented above, many strong assumptions are used to
simplify the analysis.  For example, learning-by-doing is industry-specific
and bounded.  All the households have the same order of priority over the
goods.  The assumed utility function has the strong form of Pareto-
Edgeworth complementarity.  This section explains why these assumptions
are not critical for much of the results obtained above.
6.1  Inter-industry Spillover of Learning-by-Doing
The case for learning-by-doing spillovers across industries might be
weaker than the case for learning-by-doing spillovers across different
generations of products within an industry, which has previously beenanalyzed by Stokey (1988) and many others.  Nevertheless, it is hard to
deny any presence of such interindustry spillovers.  In the previous
analysis, interindustry spillovers were excluded from the model, not
because they are empirically implausible nor because their presence would
make the analysis harder.  It was rather because their presence would
obscure the role of demand complementarity in transmitting productivity
gains from one industry to another.
It is easy to see that introducing interindustry spillovers make no
qualitative difference.  For example, no change in the analysis is needed if
Aj(Q), now a function of Q, is increasing in (Q1 ,… , Qj) and independent of
(Qj+1 ,… , QJ).   Then, the system remains recursive and cooperative.  Of
course, there is little reason to believe that learning-by-doing spillovers
only from a lower-indexed industry to a higher-indexed one, given that the
order is defined according to the household’s priority.  If Aj(Q) is increasing
in all the elements, the system is no longer recursive, only cooperative.
Note, however, that (P1), (P3), (P4), (P6) do not require the system to be
recursive.  In particular, cooperativeness alone ensures (P6).  That is, a
series of industries take off one after another, and they all grow
monotonically until the economy reaches the least element of the set of
steady states, which has a lattice structure.  The analysis of section 4 is, of
course, entirely independent of this assumption (because there is only one
industry).  It is also straightforward to extend the analysis of section 5 for
the nonrecursive case.6.2  Different Ordering of Goods Across Households.
Most results reported in section 3 will carry over even when households
differ in their ordering of goods, as long as each household has a well-
defined priority over the goods (that is, the order in which goods are
consumed is independent of the relative prices over the relevant range).
Then, the dynamical system remains cooperative, although it is no longer
recursive.  As explained in 6A, cooperativeness alone ensures (P6).  That is,
a series of industries take off one after another, and they all monotonically
converge to the lowest steady state.
There might be, however, one significant change in the qualitative feature
of the dynamics.  Some industries may catch up with and move ahead of
the industries that took off earlier.  To see this, imagine that there are three
manufacturing goods, J = 3, and two types of households.  The first type
wants good 1 most and good 2 least; the second type wants good 2 most
and good 1 least.  Good 3 is everyone’s second choice.  In such a case, it is
easy to see the possibility that the penetration rates of all the three goods
take off one after another, but the last one to take off, 3, will catch up and
move ahead of 1 and 2.
The analysis of section 4 is, of course, entirely independent of this
assumption (because there is only one industry).  The analysis of section 5would be hopelessly complicated, if households were allowed to be
different in preferences.  Indeed, the analysis of income distribution loses
much of the operational meaning, if the income is not the only source of
heterogeneity.
6.3  Alternative Specifications of the Preferences
The assumed utility function in the above model has the strong form of
Pareto-Edgeworth complementarity, which implies that, if some good is
not consumed, the households benefit nothing from consuming any higher
indexed good.  This specification was used, because it helps to preserve the
ordering of goods, independent of the relative prices.  This assumption can
be dropped without any significant change in the analysis, as long as we
impose some additional restrictions on technology that limit the range of
the equilibrium relative prices.
To see this, suppose that the utility function is now given by U  = 1 +
∑ =
J
j j jx b
1 + η l for c > 1, which has no Pareto-Edgeworth complementarity.
The value of consuming good j is simply bj > 0, regardless of whether other
goods are consumed.  Let us assume that bj is decreasing in j.  If pj is
nondecreasing in j, then all the households would buy lower-indexed
goods first.  To ensure this, we need to make some restrictions on thetechnology side.  One way of doing it is to assume that both Aj(• ) and δ j are
independent of j.  Then, if Q1(t) ≥  Q2(t) ≥  …≥  QJ(t), then C1(t) ≥  C2(t) ≥  …≥
CJ(t), which implies that Q1(s) ≥  Q2(s) ≥  …≥  QJ(s) and hence C1(s) ≥  C2(s) ≥
…≥  CJ(s) for all s ≥  t, because the speed of learning depends only on the
market size.  In other words, the region where the lower-indexed goods are
cheaper then the higher-indexed goods,  [] { } J
J Q Q Q Q  ≥ ≥ ∈ 2 1 1 , 0 , is positively
invariant.  Therefore, once the economy enters this region, the households
always buy lower-indexed goods first.  For example, if the economy starts
at  Q(0) = (0,0,…,0), then the aggregate demand for each good j can be
represented by eq. (1) for the entire future.  Hence, the analysis would go
through without any change, even though no Pareto-Edgeworth
complementarity exists across consumer goods.  What is essential for the
results is demand complementarity, or the Hicks-Allen complementarity,
i.e., a lower price of one good increases demand for other goods.
6.4  Unbounded Learning-By-Doing
In the model presented above, the development process stops eventually.
Merely allowing for infinitely many industries does not generate
unbounded growth; growth must stop, as long as learning-by-doing in
each industry is bounded.  The assumption of bounded learning-by-doing
may be plausible if we consider only narrowly defined sets of products.  Asargued by Stokey (1988) and Lucas (1993), however, the industry can learn
how to produce “new and improved” products from manufacturing
experiences of old products.  The existence of such learning-by-doing
spillovers across different generations of products make learning-by-doing
at the industry level unbounded even when the scope of learning in each
product is bounded.
The above model can be modified to allow for unbounded learning-by-
doing and hence for unbounded growth.  Suppose that there are infinitely
many industries, j = 1,..., ∞ .  The unit labor cost in each industry is given by
Aj(Qj), where Aj  is a decreasing function and satisfies Aj(∞ ) = 0. The
dynamics of Qj (t) is now governed by the initial condition, Qj (0) ≥  0, as
well as byQt j
•
() = Bj(Cj(t), Qj (t)).  The dynamical system is cooperative, if Bj is
increasing in the first argument (i.e., more production means faster
learning) and decreasing in the second argument (i.e., knowledge
depreciates).   The boundary condition, Bj (0, 0) ≥  0, ensures that the system
is well-defined over
∞
+ ℜ .  Now suppose that Bj (1, Qj ) > 0 for all Qj > 0 for all j
= 1,..., ∞ .  (That is, the market size is potentially large enough to sustain
productivity gains forever.)  Then, there exists unbounded paths along
which limt→∞  Qj(t) = ∞  and limt→∞  Cj(t) = 1 for all j = 1,..., ∞ .  The existence of
such unbounded growth paths, however, does not guarantee that the
economy grows forever for any initial condition.  If the set of steady states,
S 
∞
+ ℜ ⊂ , is nonempty, the cooperativeness of the system ensures that S is alattice and the economy converges to its least element, if the initial
condition is sufficiently close to the origin.  Only when S is empty, the
economy achieves unbounded growth.
12  The interesting question is then
what restriction on income distribution ensures that S is empty, and hence
that unbounded growth becomes attainable by the rise of a mass
consumption society.
7.  Concluding Remarks.
This paper developed a model to understand mechanisms behind the rise
of mass consumption societies. The development process depicted in the
model follows the Flying Geese pattern, in which a series of industries
takes off one after another. Central to the analysis is a two-way causality
between productivity improvement and the rise of a mass consumption
society.  As productivity improves in these industries, the prices of
consumer goods go down.  As a result, an increasingly large number of
consumer goods become affordable to an increasingly large number of
households, and spread from high-income to low-income households. This
in turn generates larger markets for consumer goods, which leads to
further improvement in productivity.
                                          
12 Note that the system is now defined over 
∞
+ ℜ instead of [0,1]
J, hence Tarski’s fixed-point theorem is not applicable,
and S can be empty.Whether such two-way causality generates virtuous cycles of productivity
gains and expanding markets depends critically on the distribution of
income across households.   For example, it was shown that income
distribution should be neither too equal nor too unequal.  If it is too equal,
the process does not begin.  If it is too unequal, it stops prematurely.  Apart
from the two extreme cases of income distribution, the effects of income
distribution turn out to be quite subtle.  This is because, for the benefits of
improved productivity to trickle down and/or to trickle up across
households, income needs to be distributed in certain ways.  For example,
it was shown that an income transfer from the Upper-middle to the Lower-
middle classes helps the benefits to spread to the Lower-middle class in
certain cases.  In other cases, it prevents the benefits from reaching even to
the Upper-middle class.
Needless to say, the above model can be extended in many directions.  Let
us discuss some useful extensions, as well as possible difficulties that may
arise from such extensions.
The above model has only one factor of production, labor.  Introducing
additional factors helps to endogenize income distribution through
changes in relative factor prices.  (Such extension is also useful when
introducing international trade in this model, as will be discussed later.)
Imagine that there are two factors, land and labor.  Food (and possibly
some lower-indexed consumer goods) is more land-intensive than (higher-indexed) consumer goods.  Furthermore, suppose that the land ownership
is highly concentrated, but the labor endowments are not.  In this case, the
distribution of income becomes more equal, as the economy develops and
the demand shifts towards higher indexed goods, thereby driving up the
wage rate faster than the land rent.  One interesting possibility may arise in
such a model.  At the beginning of development, the uneven distribution of
the land ownership ensures the presence of enough rich households, which
helps to trigger the process.  And once the economy takes off, the
wage/rent ratio adjusts to ensure the rise of a mass consumption society
with more even distribution of income.
The model may be extended to incorporate international trade.  The
important issue here is the nature and scope of dynamic increasing returns.
Suppose that learning-by-doing in production spillovers freely across
borders, so every producer in every country can learn from experiences of
other producers in the same industry in the world. (To simplify matters, let
us restrict ourselves to the case of no interindustry spillovers.)  Then, the
closed economy model presented above may be applied to the global
economy without any modification.  For example, the case of four classes
discussed in sections 4 and 5 may be reinterpreted as a model of the world
economy, which consists of four countries, where the population is
homogeneous within each country, but countries differ in their
endowments of human capital.  When the scope of learning-by-doing
spillovers is global, the only additional (but by no means trivial) issue is thepattern of international trade, which should reflect the cross-country
differences in the distribution of income.
When the scope of spillovers is not global, one needs to be careful about the
exact nature of dynamic increasing returns.  For example, suppose that
dynamic increasing returns are due to country-specific consumption
externalities, so the price of consumer good in one country depends on the
discounted cumulative consumption in that country.  Such externalities
may arise if the effort required to use a good declines, as the country’s
consumers accumulates more experiences using the good, or if the
presence of some network externalities at the national level facilitates the
use of the good.  In a two-country world, this situation can be viewed as
the case, where there are 2J consumer goods and two types of households
care for two disjoint sets of J  consumer goods.  The dynamics is thus
described by two J-dimensional cooperative dynamical systems, which are
linked by the balanced trade condition.  This linkage could potentially
make the relation between two dynamical systems competitive (in the
sense of Hirsch).  Such a possibility could arise if the rise of a mass
consumption society in one country and the resulting shifts in the
composition of demands lead to a deterioration of the terms of trade for the
other country.  If the negative effect of the terms of trade deterioration is
large enough, it could prevent the rise of a mass consumption society there.
To rule out this possibility, it is necessary to impose some restrictions on
the model.  One way of doing it is to ensure that both countries producefood in equilibrium.  Then, the terms of trade remains constant, and the
world economy can be described by two independent cooperative systems.
Of course, this is not to say that it is uninteresting to consider the
possibility that the rise of a mass consumption society in one country
prevents others from becoming mass consumption societies.  It simply
means that the mathematical technique used above have limited power in
analyzing such a case.
Let us now consider the case where the dynamic increasing returns are due
to country-specific learning by doing in production, so that the only
location of production, but not the location of consumption, matters.   As is
well known, when learning-by-doing in production is country-specific, the
initial pattern of comparative advantage tends to perpetuate.  Once the
lock-in effects of country-specific learning-by-doing take place, however,
the continuation of the dynamics of this world economy should resemble
the dynamics of the closed economy model (with multiple factor
extensions).  To see this, imagine that there are two countries, Home and
Foreign, and Home has established its comparative advantages in certain
industries, and Foreign has established its own in others.  This world
economy can be modeled by an extension of the above model, which
incorporates two factors and two types of households.  Two factors are
called Home labor and Foreign labor.  Home households are endowed only
with Home labor and Foreign households only with Foreign labor.
Furthermore, we interpret that the goods for which Home (Foreign)establishes its comparative advantages are the goods that use only Home
(Foreign) labor.  Therefore, analytically, the case of country-specific
learning-by-doing in production can be dealt with by multiple factor
extensions of the above model.  There is an additional interesting issue to
consider, however.  The benefits of expanding markets fall
disproportionately on those countries that happened to establish their
comparative advantages in higher-indexed goods, because they specialize
in the production of goods whose income elasticities of demand are higher
than the average.
13
The analysis in this paper was made simple because of the static nature of
the household’s decision problem.  Allowing for saving and borrowing or
for intertemporal substitution of consumption certainly makes the model
more realistic, but it also introduces complications that would obscure the
basic mechanisms identified in this paper.  For example, allowing for
saving could potentially make the equilibrium indeterminate, thereby
opening up the possibility of escaping the poverty trap through self-
fulfilling expectations, the possibility discussed by Matsuyama (1991b) in a
different context.  Taking into account the durability of goods would
generate an incentive for the households to delay their purchases until the
prices come down.  This would introduce another reason why the spread
                                          
13 Matsuyama (2000) explored this issue in detail in a model of international trade which has similar demand
structures with the present model, but with exogenous technological changes.of consumer goods may be gradual, thereby obscuring the role of the
nondegenerate distribution of income.
14  This is not to deny the desirability
of incorporating these factors into the model.  However, the tractability
would require to limit the analysis to the case of one industry, which
means that we have no hope for generating the Flying Geese pattern, and
even with one industry, it would be necessary to impose many stringent
restrictions on functional forms.
A similar remark can also be made on the specification of dynamic
increasing returns.  The critical feature of the present model is that the
speed of productivity improvement responds to the market size.  Learning-
by-doing with complete spillover across competitive producers is the
simplest way of capturing the feature without introducing any
intertemporal decision on the production side.  In reality, of course,
productivity improvement comes also from R&D activities.  It is not clear,
however, whether modeling dynamic increasing returns due to R& D,
instead of learning-by-doing, would generate any additional insights that
merit complications that arise from the intertemporal nature of
innovations.
15
                                          
14Jovonovic and Lach (1989) analyzed how an incentive for firms to wait for the price to come down affects the
diffusion of new technologies.
15See Zweimüller (1999) for an attempt to analyze the effect of income distribution on growth by incorporating what
he calls hierarchic preferences in an otherwise standard R&D-based endogenous growth model.Finally, in this paper the distribution of income (or more generally
purchasing power) across households is treated as the primitive of the
model.  In particular, the households are not allowed to set up lotteries.
Once the possibility of lotteries is introduced, many questions posed in this
paper, such as “what is the role of income distribution in the rise of a mass
consumption society?” or “what are the effects of income transfer?,”
themselves become ill-defined.  On a positive note, the model presented in
this paper should be a useful building block for analyzing general
equilibrium implications of lotteries and other modes of consumer
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